SR-71 flight instruments (Image source: triddle)

How a invention that flew on the SR-71 could help commercial aviation today 

In a previous post on unusual attitude I talked about the use of pitch ladders as a means of providing greater attensity to aircraft attitude as well as a better indication of what the aircraft is dong, having entered into it. There are of course still disadvantages with this because such data in a commercial aircraft is usually presented ‘eyes down’, and in high stress, high workload situations it can be difficult to maintain concentration on instruments and an instrument scan pattern. There is however an alternative, and one that has a number of advantages. Continue Reading…

R101 crash (Image source: public domain)

The R-101 is as safe as a house, except for the millionth chance. (Comment made shortly before boarding the doomed airship headed to India on its first real proving flight, 4 October 1930. The day before he had made his will.)

Lord Thomson, Secretary of State for Air

Unreliable airspeed events pose a significant challenge (and safety risk) because such situations throw onto aircrew the most difficult (and error prone) of human cognitive tasks, that of ‘understanding’ a novel situation. This results in a double whammy for unreliable airspeed incidents. That is the likelihood of an error in ‘understanding’ is far greater than any other error type, and having made that sort of error it’s highly likely that it’s going to be a fatal one. Continue Reading…

risky shift

What the?

14/02/2015 — Leave a comment

In case you’re wondering what’s going on dear reader, human factors can be a bit dry, and the occasional poster style blog posts you may have noted is my attempt to hydrate the subject a little. The continuing series can be found on the page imaginatively titled Human error in pictures, and who knows someone may find it useful…


An interesting little exposition of the current state of the practice in information risk management using the metaphor of the bald tire on the FAIR wiki. The authors observe that there’s much more shamanistic ritual (dressed up as ‘best practice’) than we’d like to think in risk assessment. A statement that I endorse, actually I think it’s mummery for the most part, but ehem, don’t tell the kids.

Their two fold point. First that while experience and intuition are vital, on their own they give little grip to critical examination. Second that if you want to manage you must measure, and to measure you need to define.

A disclaimer, I’m neither familiar with or a proponent of the FAIR tool, and I strongly doubt as to whether we can ever put risk management onto a truly scientific footing, much like engineering there’s more art than artifice, but it’s an interesting commentary nonetheless.

I give it 011 out 101 tooled up script kiddies.