I guess we’re all aware of the wave of texting while driving legislation, as well as recent moves in a number of jurisdictions to make the penalties more draconian. And it seems like a reasonable supposition that such legislation would reduce the incidence of accidents doesn’t it?
Archives For Human error
With apologies to the philosopher George Santayana, I’ll make the point that the BMW Head Up Display technology is in fact not the unalloyed blessing premised by BMW in their marketing material.
Occasional readers of this blog might have noticed my preoccupation with unreliable airspeed and the human factors and system design issues that attend it. So it was with some interest that I read the recent paper by Sathy Silva of MIT and Roger Nicholson of Boeing on aviation accidents involving unreliable airspeed.
The Buncefield report: Or overlooking the obvious
Why sometimes simpler is better in safety engineering.
I’ve just finished up the working week with a day long Safety Conversations and Observations course conducted by Dr Robert Long of Human Dymensions. A good, actually very good, course with an excellent balance between the theory of risk psychology and the practicalities of successfully carrying out safety conversations. I’d recommend it to any organisation that’s seeking to take their safety culture beyond systems and paperwork. Although he’s not a great fan of engineers.
In a recent NRCOHSR white paper on the Deeepwater Horizon explosion Professor Andrew Hopkins of the Australian National University argued that the Transocean and BP management teams that were visiting the rig on the day of the accident failed to detect the unsafe well condition because of biases in their audit practices.
Airbuses side stick improves crew comfort and control, but is there a hidden cost?
The Airbus FBW side stick flight control has vastly improved the comfort of aircrew flying the Airbus fleet, much as the original Airbus designers predicted (Corps, 188). But the implementation also expresses the Airbus approach to flight control laws and that companies implicit assumption about the way in which humans interact with automation and each other. Here the record is more problematic.
How the marking of a traffic speed hump provides a classic example of a false affordance and an unintentional hazard.Continue Reading...
So I’ve read the BEA report from one end to the other and overall it’s a solid and creditable effort. The report will probably disappoint those who are looking for a smoking gun, once again we see a system accident in which the outcome is derived from a complex interaction of system, environment, circumstance and human behavior.
However I do consider that the conclusions, and therefore recommendations, are hasty and incomplete.
This post is part of the Airbus aircraft family and system safety thread.