The ATSB has released it’s preliminary report of it’s investigation into the Cleveland street overrun accident which I covered in an earlier post, and it makes interesting reading.
Archives For Risk
What is risk, how dow we categorise it and deal with it.
On the subject of near misses…
Presumably the use of the crew cab as an escape pod was not actually high on the list of design goals for the 4000 and 4100 class locomotives, and thankfully the locomotives involved in the recent derailment at Ambrose were unmanned.
….And there are still unknown, unknowns
A while ago I posted a short piece on the difference between aleatory, epistemic and ontological uncertainty, using Don Rumsfeld’s famous news conference comments as a good introduction to the subject.
Well it sounded reasonable…
One of the things that’s concerned me for a while is the potentially malign narrative power of a published safety case.
The Buncefield report: Or overlooking the obvious
Why sometimes simpler is better in safety engineering.
While reading the 2006 Buncefield investigation report I came across this interesting statement.
“Such sensors are in widespread use and a number are available that have been certified for use in SIL2/3 applications in accordance with BS EN 61511 (1) .”
Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Report, Volume 2 Annex 4, p 28 (2006).
I was thinking about how the dubious concept of ‘safety integrity levels’ continues to persist in spite of protracted criticism. in essence if the flaws in the concept of SILs are so obvious why they still persist?
