I guess we’re all aware of the wave of texting while driving legislation, as well as recent moves in a number of jurisdictions to make the penalties more draconian. And it seems like a reasonable supposition that such legislation would reduce the incidence of accidents doesn’t it?
Archives For Risk Perception
I was reading a post by Ross Anderson on his dismal experiences at John Lewis, and ran across the term security theatre, I’ve actually heard the term, before, it was orignally coined by Bruce Schneier, but this time it got me thinking about how much activity in the safety field is really nothing more than theatrical devices that give the appearance of achieving safety, but not the reality. From zero harm initiatives to hi-vis vests, from the stylised playbook of public consultation to the use of safety integrity levels that purport to show a system is safe. How much of this adds any real value?
Worse yet, and as with security theatre, an entire industry has grown up around this culture of risk, which in reality amounts to a culture of risk aversion in western society. As I see it risk as a cultural concept is like fire, a dangerous tool and an even more terrible master.
An articulated guess beats an unspoken assumption
A point that Fred Brooks makes in his recent work the Design of Design is that it’s wiser to explicitly make specific assumptions, even if that entails guessing the values, rather than leave the assumption un-stated and vague because ‘we just don’t know’.
Brooks notes that while specific and explicit assumptions may be questioned, implicit and vague ones definitely won’t be. If a critical aspect of your design rests upon such fuzzy unarticulated assumptions, then the results can be dire. Continue Reading…
I’ve just finished up the working week with a day long Safety Conversations and Observations course conducted by Dr Robert Long of Human Dymensions. A good, actually very good, course with an excellent balance between the theory of risk psychology and the practicalities of successfully carrying out safety conversations. I’d recommend it to any organisation that’s seeking to take their safety culture beyond systems and paperwork. Although he’s not a great fan of engineers. :)
The following is an extract from Kevin Driscoll’s Murphy Was an Optimist presentation at SAFECOMP 2010. Here Kevin does the maths to show how a lack of exposure to failures over a small sample size of operating hours leads to a normalcy bias amongst designers and a rejection of proposed failure modes as ‘not credible’.
The reason I find it of especial interest is that it gives, at least in part, an empirical argument to why designers find it difficult to anticipate the system accidents of Charles Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory.
Kevin’s argument also supports John Downer’s (2010) concept of Epistemic accidents. John defines epistemic accidents as those that occur because of an erroneous technological assumption, even though there were good reasons to hold that assumption before the accident.
Kevin’s argument illustrates that engineers as technological actors must make decisions in which their knowledge is inherently limited and so their design choices will exhibit bounded rationality.
In effect the higher the dependability of a system the greater the mismatch between designer experience and system operational hours and therefore the tighter the bounds on the rationality of design choices and their underpinning assumptions. The tighter the bounds the greater the effect of congnitive biases will have, e.g. such as falling prey to the Normalcy Bias.
Of course there are other reasons for such bounded rationality, see Logic, Mathematics and Science are Not Enough for a discussion of these.
An interesting theory of risk perception and communication is put forward by Kahan (2012) in the context of climate risk.
In June of 2011 the Australian Safety Critical Systems Association (ASCSA) published a short discussion paper on what they believed to be the philosophical principles necessary to successfully guide the development of a safety critical system. The paper identified eight management and eight technical principles, but do these principles do justice to the purported purpose of the paper?