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	<title>Critical Uncertainties</title>
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	<description>Complexity, Emergence &#38; Risk in Using Technology</description>
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		<item>
		<title>Design authority and understanding</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/06/13/design-authority-and-understanding/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/06/13/design-authority-and-understanding/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Jun 2013 00:02:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[design agency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[design authority]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[understanding]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6891</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In an earlier post I had a look at the role played by design authorities in an organisation, which can have a major affect upon both safety and project success. My focus in that post was on the authority aspect. However another perspective on the role that a design authority performs is that of someone [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6891&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
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		<title>Those who ignore history</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/04/29/those-who-ignore-history/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/04/29/those-who-ignore-history/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 28 Apr 2013 23:29:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Complexity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Errors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Human error]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The human machine interface]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BMW HUD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cognitive tunneling]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[error trap]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Head Up Displays]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[human factors]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6851</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Those who cannot remember the past of human factors are doomed to repeat it&#8230; With apologies to the philosopher George Santayana, I&#8217;ll make the point that the BMW Head Up Display technology is in fact not the unalloyed blessing premised by BMW in their marketing material. The downside, which the BMW engineers seem to have [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6851&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>5</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">BMW HUD concept (Image source: BMW)</media:title>
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	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Boeing&#8217;s lithium battery woes (Pt III)</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/04/23/6839/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/04/23/6839/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2013 03:01:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Cascades]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Common cause failures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Complexity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emergent attributes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Failure classes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fault tolerance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[System architecting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[B787]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boeing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cascading failure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[common cause failures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dreamliner]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[emergent behaviour]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FAA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Li-Ion batteries]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6839</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The end of the matter&#8230;well almost Boeing and the FAA have agreed a fix for the Dreamliner&#8217;s lithium battery fire problem, which clears the way for the FAA to issue an Airworthiness Directive, and the Dreamliner fleet to get airborne. The fix includes a new stainless steel outer battery enclosure (and vent pipe overboard) as [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6839&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">New Battery boxes (Image source: Boeing)</media:title>
		</media:content>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>I&#8217;m sure they didn&#8217;t intend</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/04/05/im-sure-they-didnt-intend/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/04/05/im-sure-they-didnt-intend/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 05 Apr 2013 00:04:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Humour]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rail Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[QR 4000 class]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://msquair.wordpress.com/?p=6781</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Provided as part of the QR show bag for the CORE 2012 conference. The irony of a detachable cab being completely unintentional&#8230; Filed under: Humour, Rail Safety, Uncategorized Tagged: QR 4000 class<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6781&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>2</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">matthewsquair</media:title>
		</media:content>

		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/20130405-110510.jpg" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">20130405-110510.jpg</media:title>
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	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Battery tests and experimenter&#8217;s regress (Part II)</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/03/27/battery-tests-and-experimenters-regress-part-ii/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/03/27/battery-tests-and-experimenters-regress-part-ii/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Mar 2013 06:43:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Aerospace Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Confirmation bias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experimeter's regress]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Heuristics & Biases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philosophy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Scientific Discovery]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Battery management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boeing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Li-Ion batteries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NTSB]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6748</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The NTSB has released it&#8217;s interim report on the Boeing 787 JAL battery fire and it appears that Boeing&#8217;s initial safety assessment had concluded that the only way in which a battery fire would eventuate was through overcharging.Therefore, so the logic went, Boeing needed only to prevent overcharging and it also prevented the possibility of [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6748&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/03/27/battery-tests-and-experimenters-regress-part-ii/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>5</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">matthewsquair</media:title>
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		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/battery-post-fire.png" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">Battery post fire (Image source: NTSB)</media:title>
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		<item>
		<title>Queensland Rail and safety interfaces (Part II)</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/03/27/queensland-rail-and-safety-interfaces-part-ii/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/03/27/queensland-rail-and-safety-interfaces-part-ii/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Mar 2013 00:57:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Epistemic Risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Framing effect]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Heuristics & Biases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Interface hazard analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Psychology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rail Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk Perception]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ATSB report RO-2013-005]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cleveland street]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[John Downer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Myth of Mechanical Objectivity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Queensland rail]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[station overrun]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6724</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The ATSB has released it&#8217;s preliminary report of it&#8217;s investigation into the Cleveland street overrun accident which I covered in an earlier post, and it makes interesting reading. So first off (engage smug mode) I&#8217;ll note that my initial educated guess that there were no dedicated anti-climber features was correct. The buffer stops located at [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6724&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/03/27/queensland-rail-and-safety-interfaces-part-ii/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">matthewsquair</media:title>
		</media:content>

		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/train-overrun.png" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">Cleveland street train overrun (Image source: ATSB)</media:title>
		</media:content>
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		<item>
		<title>The 4000 class loco escape pod</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/03/19/the-4000-class-loco-escape-pod/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/03/19/the-4000-class-loco-escape-pod/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2013 02:33:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Framing effect]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ontological Risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rail Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[crashworthiness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Escape pod]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[QR 4000 class]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[QR 4100 class]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rolling stock]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rollover]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[specification practices]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[structural loads]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6629</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[On the subject of near misses&#8230; Presumably the use of the crew cab as an escape pod was not actually high on the list of design goals for the 4000 and 4100 class locomotives, and thankfully the locomotives involved in the recent derailment at Ambrose were unmanned. The separation of the cab from the rest [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6629&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>2</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">matthewsquair</media:title>
		</media:content>

		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/4100-class-crew-escape-pod-0.jpg" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">4100 class crew escape pod #0</media:title>
		</media:content>

		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/4100-class-crew-escape-pod-1.jpg" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">4100 class crew escape pod #1</media:title>
		</media:content>

		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/4100-class-crew-escape-pod-2.jpg" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">The 4100 class locomotive to which the cab belonged, note th gouge in the grass from the first impact of the detached cab</media:title>
		</media:content>

		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/4100-class-crew-escape-pod-4.jpg" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">The other mid-consist 4000 class locomotive showing the same cab separation</media:title>
		</media:content>

		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/4100-class-crew-escape-pod-3.jpg" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">In this close up of QR 4128&#039;s platform you can see the witness marks on the collision structure hard mounted at the end of the platform.</media:title>
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		<title>The return of the Yellow Book</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/03/05/the-return-of-the-yellow-book/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/03/05/the-return-of-the-yellow-book/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Mar 2013 21:18:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Rail Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[iESM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rail safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technical Program Delivery]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yellow Book]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6617</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[That much beloved safety engineering handbook of the UK rail industry, the Yellow Book, is back. The handbook has been re-released as the International Handbook Engineering Safety Management (iESM). Re-development is being carried out by Technical Program Delivery Ltd and the original authoring team of Dr Rob Davis, Paul Cheeseman and Bruce Elliot. As with [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6617&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">matthewsquair</media:title>
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		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/yellowbook-rail-org-uk.gif" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">yellowbook-rail.org.uk</media:title>
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		<title>Understanding unreliable airspeed&#8230;</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/03/04/understanding-unreliable-airspeed/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/03/04/understanding-unreliable-airspeed/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Mar 2013 06:17:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Aerospace Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Errors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Human error]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Psychology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cognitive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rasmussen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[unreliable air speed]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6570</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Occasional readers of this blog might have noticed my preoccupation with unreliable airspeed and the human factors and system design issues that attend it. So it was with some interest that I read the recent paper by Sathy Silva of MIT and Roger Nicholson of Boeing on aviation accidents involving unreliable airspeed. Part of their [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6570&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>3</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">matthewsquair</media:title>
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		<title>Unusual attitude</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/28/unusual-attitude/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/28/unusual-attitude/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Feb 2013 05:30:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Aerospace Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Complexity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fault tolerance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Never give up strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Attitude Reference Indicatior]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pitch ladder]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spatial disorientation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[unreliable airspeed]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[unusual attitude]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6500</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[No, not the alternative name for this blog. I&#8217;ve just given the post Pitch ladders and unusual attitude a solid rewrite adding some new material and looking a little more deeply at some of the underlying safety myths. Filed under: Aerospace Safety, Complexity, Fault tolerance, Never give up strategy, Safety, Technology Tagged: Attitude Reference Indicatior, [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6500&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
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		<title>The Rumsfeld ignorance management framework</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/26/the-don-rumsfeld-ignorance-management-framework/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/26/the-don-rumsfeld-ignorance-management-framework/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 25 Feb 2013 21:44:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Aleatory Risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epistemic Risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Off Topic...]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ontological Risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Don Rumsfeld]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[epistemic risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ignorance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ignorance management framework]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[knowledge]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ontological risk]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6463</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#8230;.And there are still unknown, unknowns A while ago I posted a short piece on the difference between aleatory, epistemic and ontological uncertainty, using Don Rumsfeld&#8217;s famous news conference comments as a good introduction to the subject. As it turns out Patrick Lambe over on Green Chameleon has taken Rumsfeld&#8217;s remarks and developed them, somewhat [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6463&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/26/the-don-rumsfeld-ignorance-management-framework/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">The pentagon is functioning (Image Source: USN)</media:title>
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		<title>There&#8217;s always a silver lining&#8230;</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/23/theres-always-a-silver-lining/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/23/theres-always-a-silver-lining/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2013 06:03:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[humour]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://msquair.wordpress.com/?p=6456</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[For somebody. Filed under: Uncategorized Tagged: humour<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6456&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/23/theres-always-a-silver-lining/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">matthewsquair</media:title>
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		<title>Battery tests and experimenter&#8217;s regress</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/21/battery-tests-and-the-experimenters-regress/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/21/battery-tests-and-the-experimenters-regress/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2013 07:46:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Aerospace Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Confirmation bias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experimeter's regress]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philosophy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Psychology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Scientific Discovery]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[787]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boeing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Li-Ion batteries]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6440</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[But, we tested it? Didn&#8217;t we? Earlier reports of the Boeing 787 lithium battery initial development indicated that Boeing engineers had conducted tests to confirm that a single cell failure would not lead to a cascading thermal runaway amongst the remaining batteries. According to these reports their tests were successful, so what went wrong? The [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6440&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/21/battery-tests-and-the-experimenters-regress/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">matthewsquair</media:title>
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			<media:title type="html">787 Lithium Battery (Image Source: JTSB)</media:title>
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		<title>Safety Cases and the Narrative Fallacy</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/18/safety-cases-and-the-narrative-fallacy/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/18/safety-cases-and-the-narrative-fallacy/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Feb 2013 08:24:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Confirmation bias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epistemic Risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety cases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Inverse problem of Rare Events]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[narrative fallacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nassim Nicholas Taleb]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[safety cases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Black Swan]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6416</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Well it sounded reasonable&#8230; One of the things that&#8217;s concerned me for a while is the potentially malign narrative power of a published safety case. For those unfamiliar with the term, a safety case can be defined, as a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6416&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/18/safety-cases-and-the-narrative-fallacy/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">matthewsquair</media:title>
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		<item>
		<title>And sometimes a meteorite falls on your reactor</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/16/and-sometimes-a-meteorite-falls-on-your-reactor/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/16/and-sometimes-a-meteorite-falls-on-your-reactor/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 16 Feb 2013 12:51:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Power Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear weapons safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chelyabinsk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[meteor]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://msquair.wordpress.com/?p=6412</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[As my parents in law live in Chelyabinsk I have to admit a personal interest in the recent Russian meteor impact. But, given that the Chelyabinsk region is home to a number of nuclear sites, the incident did raise a question in my mind as to whether meteor impacts are considered in the design basis [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6412&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/16/and-sometimes-a-meteorite-falls-on-your-reactor/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>7</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">matthewsquair</media:title>
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			<media:title type="html">20130216-210811.jpg</media:title>
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			<media:title type="html">20130216-211116.jpg</media:title>
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		<title>IEC 61508 weaknesses and anomalies</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/15/iec-61508-weaknesses-and-anomalies/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/15/iec-61508-weaknesses-and-anomalies/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2013 21:15:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IEC 61508]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RVS Bielefield]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[safety myths]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SIL]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6401</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Over on the RVS Bielefield site Peter Ladkin has just put up a white paper  entitled 61508 Weaknesses and Anomalies which looks at the problems with the current version of the IEC 61508 functional safety standard, part 6 of which sits on my desk even as we speak. Comments are welcome. For my own contributions to the commentary [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6401&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/15/iec-61508-weaknesses-and-anomalies/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">matthewsquair</media:title>
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		<title>Boeing&#8217;s lithium woes (Pt II)</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/12/boeings-lithium-woes-pt-ii/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/12/boeings-lithium-woes-pt-ii/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Feb 2013 07:31:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Aerospace Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Common cause failures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ad-hoc design]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[B787]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Battery management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boeing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dreamliner]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FAA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[GS Yuasa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Li-Ion batteries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety architectures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thales]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[thermal runaway]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6333</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[A bit more on Boeing&#8217;s battery woes&#8230; The NTSB has released more pictures of the JAL battery, and there are some interesting conclusions that can be drawn from the evidence to date. First the NTSB took an X-ray (see above) of the battery, note how the battery cell cases have distorted causing them to come [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6333&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
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		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/x-ray-of-jal-battery.jpg" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">X-Ray of JAL Battery (Image Source: NTSB)</media:title>
		</media:content>

		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/cells-5-8-substantial-thermal-damage.jpg" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">JAL Battery cells 5-8 showing substantial thermal damage (Image Source: NTSB)</media:title>
		</media:content>

		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/cells-1-7-moderate-thermal-damage.jpg" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">JAL battery cells 1-7 showing moderate thermal damage (Image Source: NTSB)</media:title>
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		<item>
		<title>Letting the smoke out, Boeing&#8217;s battery woes&#8230;</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/07/letting-the-smoke-out-boeings-lithium-battery-woes/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/07/letting-the-smoke-out-boeings-lithium-battery-woes/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Feb 2013 06:00:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Aerospace Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Common cause failures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Complexity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fault tolerance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stochastic processes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[B787]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Battery management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boeing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dreamliner]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FAA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[GS Yuasa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Li-Ion batteries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety architectures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thales]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[thermal runaway]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6238</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Boeing&#8217;s Dreamliner program runs into trouble with lithium ion batteries Lithium batteries performance in providing lightweight, low volume power storage has made them a ubiquitous part of modern consumer life. And high power density also makes them attractive in applications, such as aerospace, where weight and space are at a premium. Unfortunately lithium batteries are also [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6238&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/07/letting-the-smoke-out-boeings-lithium-battery-woes/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>2</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">matthewsquair</media:title>
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		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/jal-fire-image-source-stephan-savoia-ap-photo.jpg" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">JAL JA829J Fire (Image Source: Stephan Savoia AP Photo)</media:title>
		</media:content>

		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/jal-event-battery-image-source-ntsb.jpg" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">JAL Event Battery (Image Source: NTSB)</media:title>
		</media:content>

		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/jal-event-battery-cell-view-image-source-ntsb.jpg" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">JAL Event Battery - Cell View (Image Source: NTSB)</media:title>
		</media:content>

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			<media:title type="html">Thales Battery Charger Unit (Image Source: NTSB)</media:title>
		</media:content>

		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/damage-to-aft-elex-bay-of-jal-image-source-ntsb.jpg" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">Damage to Aft Elex Bay of JAL (Image Source: NTSB)</media:title>
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		<item>
		<title>Engineering a Safer World course</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/05/engineering-a-safer-world-course/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/05/engineering-a-safer-world-course/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 05 Feb 2013 08:29:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Engineering a Safer World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nancy Leveson]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://msquair.wordpress.com/?p=6236</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Dr Nancy Leveson will be teaching a week-long class on system safety this year at the Talaris Conference Center in Seattle from July 15-19. Her focus will be on the new techniques and approaches described in her latest book Engineering a Safer World. Should be excellent. See the class announcement for further details. Filed under: [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6236&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
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		<title>Queensland Rail and safety interfaces</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/04/queensland-rail-and-safety-interfaces/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/02/04/queensland-rail-and-safety-interfaces/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Feb 2013 02:10:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Rail Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bayside train crash]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[buffer stop]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[end of track overrun]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Interface Hazard Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[QR commuter train]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RPEQ]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[safety critical interfaces]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SHA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[System Hazard Analysis]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6207</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[It is a fact universally acknowledged that a station platform is invariably in need of a good buffer-stop&#8230;. On the 31st of January 2013 a QR commuter train slammed into the end of platform barrier at the Cleveland street station, overrode it and ran into the station structure before coming to rest. While the media [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6207&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>2</slash:comments>
	
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			<media:title type="html">matthewsquair</media:title>
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			<media:title type="html">QR Train crash (Image Source: Bayside Bulletin )</media:title>
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			<media:title type="html">Buffers - Helsinki Train Station (Image Source: M.Squair)</media:title>
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			<media:title type="html">Front of commuter train (IMage Source: Bayside Herald)</media:title>
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		<item>
		<title>Buncefield &#8211; The alternate view</title>
		<link>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/01/29/buncefield-the-alternate-view/</link>
		<comments>http://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/01/29/buncefield-the-alternate-view/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Jan 2013 05:56:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Squair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Common cause failures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Design]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dissimilar Redundancy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fail safe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Human error]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety Integrity Levels (SILs)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Buncefield]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[COMAH]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[safety integrity levels]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK HSE]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://criticaluncertainties.com/?p=6177</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The Buncefield report: Or overlooking the obvious Why sometimes simpler is better in safety engineering. In the early hours of Sunday 11th December 2005, a number of explosions occurred at Buncefield Oil Storage Depot in Hertfordshire. At least one of the initial explosions was of massive proportions and there was a large fire that engulfed [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=criticaluncertainties.com&#038;blog=7867701&#038;post=6177&#038;subd=msquair&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
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		<media:content url="http://1.gravatar.com/avatar/ac75f345134362d1b4d764e748d1be37?s=96&#38;d=identicon&#38;r=G" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">matthewsquair</media:title>
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		<media:content url="http://msquair.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/casu05big.jpg" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">Buncefield Tank on Fire (Image Source: Royal Chiltern Air Support Unit)</media:title>
		</media:content>
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