The quote below is from the eminent British scientist Lord Kelvin, who also pronounced that x-rays were a hoax, that heavier than air flying machines would never catch on and that radio had no future…

I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, then you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your may knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science, whatever that may be.

Lord Kelvin, 1891

I’d turn that statement about and remark that once you have a number in your grasp, your problems have only just started. And that numbers shorn of context are a meagre and entirely unsatisfactory way of expressing our understanding of the world.

When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that something is possible, he is almost certainly right. When he states that something is impossible, he is very probably wrong.

Arthur C. Clarke,  Profiles of the Future (1962)

I often think that Arthur C. Clarke penned his famous laws in direct juxtaposition to the dogmatic statements of Lord Kelvin. It’s nice to think so anyway. :)

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Back at the ADFA campus to present the July IDM system safety course. A little cooler this time of year. :)

Just added a modified version of the venerable subjective 882 hazard risk matrix to my useful stuff page in which I fix a few issues that have bugged me about that particular tool, see Risk and the Matrix for a fuller discussion of the problems with risk matrices.

For those of you with a strong interest in such I’ve translated the matrix into cartesian coordinates, revised the risk zone and definitions to make the matrix ‘De Moivre theorem’ compliant (and a touch more conservative), added the AIAA’s combinatorial probability thresholds, introduced a calibration point and added the ALARP principal.

Who knows maybe the US DoD will pick it up…but probably not. :)

MIL-STD-882 Hazard Risk Matrix (Modified).

 

Waaay back in 2002 Chris Holloway wrote a paper that used a fictional civil court case involving the hazardous failure of software to show that much of the expertise and received wisdom of software engineering was, using the standards of the US federal judiciary, junky and at best opinion based.

Rereading the transcripts of Phillip Koopman, and Michael Barr in the 2013 Toyota spaghetti monster case I am struck both by how little things have changed and how far actual state of the industry can be from state of the practice, let alone state of the art. Life recapitulates art I guess, though not in a good way.

I’ve put the original Def Stan 00-55 (both parts) onto my resources page for those who are interested in doing a compare and contrast between the old, and the new (whenever it’s RFC is released). I’ll be interested to see whether the standards reluctance to buy into the whole safety by following a process argument is maintained in the next iteration. The problem of arguing from fault density to safety that they allude to also remains, I believe, insurmountable.

The justification of how the SRS development process is expected to deliver SRS of the required safety integrity level, mainly on the basis of the performance of the process on previous projects, is covered in 7.4 and annex E. However, in general the process used is a very weak predictor of the safety integrity level attained in a particular case, because of the variability from project to project. Instrumentation of the process to obtain repeatable data is difficult and enormously expensive, and capturing the important human factors aspects is still an active research area. Furthermore, even very high quality processes only predict the fault density of the software, and the problem of predicting safety integrity from fault density is insurmountable at the time of writing (unless it is possible to argue for zero faults).

Def Stan 00-55 Issue 2 Part 2 Cl. 7.3.1

Just as an aside, the original release of Def Stan 00-56 is also worth a look as it contains the methodology for the assignment of safety integrity levels. Basically for a single function or N>1 non-independent functions the SIL assigned to the function(s) is derived from the worst credible accident severity (much like DO-178). In the case of N>1 independent functions, one of these functions gets a SIL based on severity but the remainder have a SIL rating apportioned to them based on risk criteria. From which you can infer that the authors, just like the aviation community were rather mistrustful of using estimates of probability in assuring a first line of defence. :)

When Formal Systems Kill, an interesting paper by Lee Pike and Darren Abramson looking at the automatic formal system property of computers from an ethical perspective. Of course as we all know, the 9000 series has a perfect operational record…

Tweedle Dum and Dee (Image source: Wikipedia Commons)

Revisiting the Knight, Leveson experiments

In the through the looking glass world of high integrity systems, the use of N-version programming is often touted as a means to achieve extremely lower failure rates without extensive V&V, due to the postulated independence of failure in independently developed software. Unfortunately this is hockum, as Knight and Leveson amply demonstrated with their N version experiments, but there may actually be advantages to N versioning, although not quite what the proponents of it originally expected.

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