Engineers as the agents of evolution
Archives For Risk
From Les Hatton, here’s how, in four easy steps:
- Insist on using R = F x C in your assessment. This will panic HR (People go into HR to avoid nasty things like multiplication.)
- Put “end of universe” as risk number 1 (Rationale: R = F x C. Since the end of the universe has an infinite consequence C, then no matter how small the frequency F, the Risk is also infinite)
- Ignore all other risks as insignificant
- Wait for call from HR…
A humorous note, amongst many, in an excellent presentation on the fell effect that bureaucracies can have upon the development of safety critical systems. I would add my own small corollary that when you see warning notes on microwaves and hot water services the risk assessment lunatics have taken over the asylum…
In June of 2011 the Australian Safety Critical Systems Association (ASCSA) published a short discussion paper on what they believed to be the philosophical principles necessary to successfully guide the development of a safety critical system. The paper identified eight management and eight technical principles, but do these principles do justice to the purported purpose of the paper?
I’ve recently been reading John Downer on what he terms the Myth of Mechanical Objectivity. To summarise John’s argument he points out that once the risk of an extreme event has been ‘formally’ assessed as being so low as to be acceptable it becomes very hard for society and it’s institutions to justify preparing for it (Downer 2011).
Why something as simple as control stick design can break an aircrew’s situational awareness
One of the less often considered aspects of situational awareness in the cockpit is the element of knowing what the ‘guy in the other seat is doing’. This is a particularly important part of cockpit error management because without a shared understanding of what someone is doing it’s kind of difficult to detect errors.
There are few purely technical problems…
The Washington Post has discovered that concerns about the vulnerability of the Daiichi Fukushima plant to potential Tsunami events were brushed aside at a review of nuclear plant safety conducted in the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake. Yet at other plants the Japanese National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (NISA) had directed the panel of engineers and geologists to consider tsunami events.