Here’s a working draft of the introduction and first chapter of my book…. Enjoy ūüôā

We are hectored on an almost daily basis as to the imminent threat of islamic extremism and how we must respond firmly to this real and present danger. Indeed we have proceeded far enough along the escalation of response ladder that this, presumably existential threat, is now being used to justify talk of internment without trial. So what is the probability that if you were murdered, the murderer would be an immigrant terrorist?

In NSW in 2014 there were 86 homicides, of these 1 was directly related to the act of a islamist terrorist (1). So there’s a 1 in 86 chance that in that year¬†if you were murdered¬†it was at the hands of a mentally disturbed asylum seeker (2). Hmm sounds risky, but is it?¬†Well not really, there was approximately 2.5 million people in NSW in 2014 so the likelihood of being murdered (in that year) is in the first instance 3.44e-5. If we multiply this by the likelihood that it was at the hands of a `terrorist’ then we end up with 4e-7 or 4 chances in 10 million. If we consider subsequent and prior years where nothing happened that likelihood becomes even smaller.

Yet based on this 4 in 10 million chance for one year the NSW government intends to build a super-max 2 prison in NSW, and fill it with ‘terrorists’ while the Federal government enacts more anti-terrorism laws that take us down the road to the surveillance state, if we’re not already there yet. The glaring difference between the perception of risk and the actuality is one that our political class seem oblivious to (3).

Notes

1. One death during the Lindt chocolate siege that could be directly attributed to the `terrorist’.

2. Sought and granted in 2001 by the Liberal National Party government.

3. An action that also ignores the role of prisons in converting inmates to Islam as a route to recruiting their criminal, anti-social and violent sub-populations in the service of Sunni extremists.

The Sydney Morning Herald published an article this morning that recounts the QF72 midair accident from the point of view¬†of the crew and passengers, you can find the story at this link. I’ve previously covered the technical aspects of the accident here, the underlying integrative¬†architecture¬†program that brought us to this point here and the consequences¬†here.¬†So it was interesting to reflect on the event from the human perspective. Karl Weick points out in his influential paper on the Mann Gulch fire disaster that small organisations, for example the crew of an airliner, are vulnerable to what he termed a cosmology episode, that is an abruptly one feels deeply that the universe is no longer a rational, orderly system. In the case of QF72 this was initiated by the simultaneous stall and overspeed warnings, followed by the abrupt pitch over of the aircraft as the flight protection laws engaged for no reason.

Weick further posits that what makes such an episode so shattering is that both the sense of what is occurring and the means to rebuild that sense collapse together. In the Mann Gulch blaze the fire team’s organisation attenuated and finally broke down as the situation eroded until at the end they could not comprehend the one action that would have saved their lives, to build an escape fire. In¬†the case of¬†air crew they implicitly rely on the aircraft’s systems to `make sense’ of the situation, a significant¬†failure such as occurred on QF72 denies them both understanding of what is happening and the ability to rebuild that understanding. Weick also noted that in such crises organisations are important as they help people to¬†provide order and meaning in ill defined and uncertain circumstances, which has interesting implications when we look at the automation in the cockpit as another member of the team.

“The plane is not communicating with me. It’s in meltdown. The systems are all vying for attention but they are not telling me anything…It’s high-risk and I don’t know what’s going to happen.”

Capt. Kevin Sullivan (QF72 flight)

From this Weickian viewpoint we see the aircraft’s automation as both part of the situation `what is happening?’ and as a¬†member of the crew, `why is it doing that, can I trust it?’¬†Thus the crew of QF72 were faced with both a vu jaŐÄdeŐĀ moment and the allied disintegration of the human-machine partnership¬†that could help them make sense of the situation. The challenge that the QF72 crew faced was not to form a decision based on clear data and well rehearsed procedures from the flight manual, but instead they faced much more unnerving loss of meaning as the situation outstripped their past experience.

“Damn-it! We’re going to crash. It can’t be true! (copilot #1)

“But, what’s happening? copilot #2)

AF447 CVR transcript (final words)

Nor was this an isolated incident, one¬†study of other such `unreliable airspeed’ events, found¬†errors in understanding were both far more likely to occur than other error types and when they did much more likely to end in a fatal accident.¬†¬†In¬†fact they found that all accidents with a fatal outcome were categorised as involving an error in detection or understanding with the majority being errors of understanding. From Weick’s perspective then the collapse of sensemaking is the knock out blow in such scenarios, as the last words of the Air France AF447 crew so grimly illustrate. Luckily in¬†the case of QF72 the aircrew were able to contain this collapse, and rebuild their sense of the situation, in the case of other such failures, such as AF447, they were not.

 

For those of you who might be wondering at the lack of recent posts I’m a little pre-occupied at the moment as I’m writing a book. Hope to have a first draft ready in July.¬†; )

And there goes net neutrality & privacy… Thanks Trump

Black Saturday fires (Image source: ABC)

With the NSW Rural Fire Service fighting more than 50 fires across the state and the unprecedented hellish conditions set to deteriorate even further with the arrival of strong winds the question of the day is, exactly how bad could this get? The answer is unfortunately, a whole lot worse. That’s because we have difficulty as human beings in thinking about and dealing with extreme events… To quote from a post I wrote in the aftermath of the 2009 Victorian Black Saturday fires.

So how unthinkable could it get? The likelihood of a fire versus it’s severity can be credibly modelled as a power law a particular type of heavy tailed distribution (Clauset et al. 2007). This means that extreme events in the tail of the distribution are far more likely than predicted by a gaussian (the classic bell curve) distribution. So while a mega fire ten times the size of the Black Saturday fires is far less likely it is not completely improbable as our intuitive availability heuristic would indicate. In fact it’s much worse than we might think, in heavy tail distributions you need to apply what’s called the mean excess heuristic which really translates to the next worst event is almost always going to be much worse…

So how did we get to this?  Well simply put the extreme weather we’ve been experiencing is a tangible, current day effect of climate change. Climate change is not something we can leave to our children to really worry about, it’s happening now. That half a degree rise in global temperature? Well it turns out it supercharges the heavy tail of bushfire severity. Putting it even more simply it look’s like we’ve been twisting the dragon’s tail and now it’s woken up…

Matrix (Image source: The Matrix film)

How algorithm can kill…

So apparently the Australian Government has been buying it’s software from Cyberdyne Systems, or at least you’d be forgiven for thinking so given the brutal (dare I say inhumane) treatment Centerlink’s autonomous debt recovery software has been handing¬†out to welfare recipients who ‘it’ believes have been rorting the system. Yep, you heard right it’s a completely automated compliance¬†operation (well at least the issuing part).¬† Continue Reading…