The QF 72 accident illustrates the significant effects that ‘small field’ decisions can have on overall system safety
In an earlier post on the QF 72 accident I discussed the implications of the Airbus voting algorithm had for safety in the presence of ‘bursty’ non time independent noise in a sensor channel. In that post I noted that the median statistic when comparing redundant data is less sensitive to outlier values than the arithmetic mean. Which is why median voting algorithms are preferred for critical control applications.
Of course you may still be left with a problem of trying to derive a valid estimate from only two values (AoA 1 and 2 for the A330) in which case the median algorithm (which needs a minimum of three values) is not much help. In these circumstances we might be tempted to fall back on the use of the arithmetic mean (summing and dividing by 2). However the problem with this is that the statistic will be unduly influenced by high end values. In other words we’re back were we started. Well not necessarily…
If we instead used the geometric mean of the two values, where we multiply them together and take the square root, we can generate a statistic that is much less sensitive to outliers.
Example. Using the normal AoA (1.2 degrees) and spike AoA (50.6 degrees) observed on QF 72 we would derive an arithmetic and geometric mean of 26.4 and 7.8 degrees respectively.
In the case of the Airbus logic, use of the geometric mean across the experienced set off AoA values would have resulted in a far smaller resultant AoA, minimising the resultant pitch over severity. To that extent we can say that the geometric mean is more robust a calculation than the arithmetic in the face of ‘out of specification’ values.
What’s interesting to me is not necessarily that one statistic is better or worse but rather how a small ‘local’ design decision, in this case as to the use of a specific statistic, can have significant system level consequences.