AF447 « Critical Uncertainties

How the ATSB is mismanaging the MH370 search

13/03/2015

Bayes and the search for MH370

We are now approximately 60% of the way through searching the MH370 search area, and so far nothing. Which is unfortunate because as the search goes on the cost continues to go up for the taxpayer (and yes I am one of those). What’s more unfortunate, and not a little annoying, is that that through all this the ATSB continues to stonily ignore the use of a powerful search technique that’s been used to find everything from lost nuclear submarines to the wreckage of passenger aircraft. Continue Reading…

In Aerospace Safety, Uncertainty AF447, Bayesian search, MH370

Whatever happened to AirAsia QZ8501? Pt II

22/01/2015

Stall warning and Alternate law

This post is part of the Airbus aircraft family and system safety thread.

According to an investigator from Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) several alarms, including the stall warning, could be heard going off on the Cockpit Voice Recorder’s tape.

Now why is that so significant?

In Aerospace Safety, Highly optimised tolerance, Safety, Software AF447, AirAsia QZ8501, Cockpit voice recorder

The C* continuum

19/01/2015

This post is part of the Airbus aircraft family and system safety thread.

While there’s often a lot of discussion about short term response of aircraft to control inputs, in practice it’s often the long term response of the aircraft state vector at constant thrust and neutral control inputs that’s just as important to flight control system designers. In the case of Airbus the selection by the designers of a modified C* feedback loop (1) for primary pitch axis control law (Airbus 1998) in flight has led to what you’d call interesting consequences. Continue Reading…

In Aerospace Safety, Never give up strategy AF447, AirBus, C* feedback, resilience, robustness

Triggered transmission of flight data

Posted on 15/03/2014 In Aerospace Safety, Safety AF447, data links, ELT, INMARSAT, iridium, SATCOM

Side sticks and shared situational awareness

27/07/2011

Why something as simple as control stick design can break an aircrew’s situational awareness

One of the less often considered aspects of situational awareness in the cockpit is the element of knowing what the ‘guy in the other seat is doing’. This is a particularly important part of cockpit error management because without a shared understanding of what someone is doing it’s kind of difficult to detect errors.

In Aerospace Safety, Human error, The human machine interface AF447, AirBus, centre stick controller, cockpit error management, crew resource management, Risk, Safety, side stick controller

On the brittleness of software

23/07/2011

Requirements completeness and the AF447 stall warning

Reading through the BEA’s precis of the data contained on Air France’s AF447 Flight Data Recorder you find that during the final minutes of AF447 the aircrafts stall warning ceased, even though the aircraft was still stalled, thereby removed a significant cue to the aircrew that they had flown the aircraft into a deep stall.

In Aerospace Safety, Human error, The human machine interface AF447, Air France, design assumptions, design paradigm, epistemic risk, James Reason, never give up design strategy, requirements incompleteness, Software latent fault, stall warning

Pitch ladders and unusual attitude recovery

05/07/2011

Because they have typically pitch unity ratios (1:1) scales, aircraft primary flight displays provide a pitch display that is limited by the vertical field of view. This display can move very rapidly and be difficult to use in unusual attitude recoveries becoming another adverse performance shaping factor for aircrew in such a scenario. Trials by the USAF have conclusively demonstrated that an articulated style of pitch ladder can reduce disorientation of aircrew in such situations.

In Aerospace Safety, Psychology, The human machine interface AF447, F16, HUD, partially articulated, PFD, pitch ladder, Primary Flight Display, unusual attitude recovery, US DoD

Hindsight and AF447

23/06/2011

Knowing the outcome of an accident flight does not ‘explain’ the accident

Hindsight bias and it’s mutually reinforcing cognitive cousin the just world hypothesis are traditional parts of public comment on a major air accident investigation when pilot error is revealed as a causal factor. The public comment in various forum after the release of the BEA’s precis on AF447 is no exception.

This post is part of the Airbus aircraft family and system safety thread.

In Aerospace Safety, Human error AF447, error patterns, Hindsight bias, human error, just world hypothesis, NASA Ames

AF447… What we now know

27/05/2011

The BEA has released a precis of the data contained on AF447’s Flight Data Recorder and we can know look into the cockpit of AF447 in those last terrifying minutes.

In Aerospace Safety, Human error accident sequence, AF 447, AF447, Air France, AirBus, BEA Investigation, epistemic risk, Fault tolerance, human machine interface, system architecture

Critical Uncertainties

Archives For AF447

How the ATSB is mismanaging the MH370 search

Whatever happened to AirAsia QZ8501? Pt II

The C* continuum

Triggered transmission of flight data

Side sticks and shared situational awareness

On the brittleness of software

Pitch ladders and unusual attitude recovery

Hindsight and AF447

AF447… What we now know

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